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Abstract
This paper studies the capacity of the multi-antenna or multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) secrecy
channels with multiple eavesdroppers having single/multiple antennas. It is known that the MIMO secrecy
capacity is achievable with the optimal transmit covariance matrix that maximizes the minimum difference
between the channel mutual information of the secrecy user and those of the eavesdroppers. The MIMO
secrecy capacity computation can thus be formulated as a non-convex max-min problem, which cannot be
solved efficiently by standard convex optimization techniques. To handle this difficulty, we explore a relationship
between the MIMO secrecy channel and the recently developed MIMO cognitive radio (CR) channel, in which
the multi-antenna secondary user transmits over the same spectrum simultaneously with multiple primary users
having single/multiple antennas, subject to the received interference power constraints at the primary users, or the
so-called “interference temperature (IT)” constraints. By constructing an auxiliary CR MIMO channel that has
the same channel responses as the MIMO secrecy channel, we prove that the optimal transmit covariance matrix
to achieve the secrecy capacity is the same as that to achieve the CR spectrum sharing capacity with properly
selected IT constraints under certain conditions. Based on this relationship, several algorithms are proposed to
solve the non-convex secrecy capacity computation problem by transforming it into a sequence of CR spectrum
sharing capacity computation problems that are convex. For the case with single-antenna eavesdroppers, the
proposed algorithms obtain the exact capacity of the MIMO secrecy channel, while for the case with multi-
antenna eavesdroppers, the proposed algorithms obtain both upper and lower bounds on the MIMO secrecy
capacity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, Wyner introduced a secrecy transmission model in his seminal work [1] on information-
theoretic secrecy. In this model, the secrecy transmitter sends confidential messages to a legitimate
receiver subject to the requirement that the messages cannot be decoded by an eavesdropper. The
information-theoretic study of the secrecy transmission problem has been continued and extended to
many other channel models, including broadcast channels (BCs) [2], [3], multiple access channels
(MACs) [4], [5], and interference channels (ICs) [6], [7]. Very recently, the secrecy capacity of the
multi-antenna/multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel has been characterized by Khisti and
Wornell [8], and Oggier and Hassibi [9]. In their work, the MIMO secrecy channel with a single
eavesdropper having multiple antennas is transformed into a degraded MIMO-BC, whose capacity is an
upper bound on the secrecy capacity. It was shown in [8], [9] that this capacity upper bound is indeed
tight for the Gaussian noise case, i.e., the exact secrecy capacity. However, this computable secrecy
capacity cannot be extended to the general case of multiple eavesdroppers. Moreover, Liu and Shammai
[10] also established the MIMO secrecy capacity by using the channel enhancement technique [11].
However, no computable characterization of the secrecy capacity was provided in [10].
On the other hand, cognitive radio is considered as an efficient technology to dramatically improve
spectrum utilization, thus having great potential to solve spectrum scarcity problem. In a spectrum-
sharing CR system, the CR user or the so-called secondary user (SU) is allowed to simultaneously
transmit with the licensed primary user (PU) over the same spectrum, provided that the SU to PU
interference level is regulated below a predefined threshold, which is also called the “interference
temperature (IT)” constraint. The capacity achieving transmission problems under the IT constraint for
the secondary users have been studied in [12], [13], and [14] for the CR MIMO point-to-point channel,
the CR MIMO-MAC, and the CR MIMO-BC, respectively. Since the IT constraint is a linear function
of the transmit covariance matrix, the capacity characterization problem for the CR MIMO channel can
be formulated as a convex optimization problem, and is thus solvable via the standard interior point
method [12]. It is worth noting that the system models of the secrecy channel and the CR channel are
fairly similar in the sense that the secrecy and SU transmitters need to regulate the resultant signal power
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and PU protection, respectively.
In this paper, we study the capacity computation problem for the general case of the MIMO secrecy
channel with multiple eavesdroppers having single/multiple antennas. Based on the results in [8], [9],
the related MIMO secrecy capacity can be obtained via optimizing over the transmit covariance matrix
of the secrecy user to maximize the minimum difference between the mutual information of the secrecy
channel and those of the channels from the secrecy transmitter to different eavesdroppers. It can
thus be shown that the resulting capacity computation problem is a non-convex max-min optimization
problem, which cannot be solved efficiently with standard convex optimization techniques. To handle
this difficulty, we consider an auxiliary CR MIMO channel with multiple PUs having single/multiple
antennas and the same channel responses as those in the MIMO secrecy problem. We next establish
a relationship between this auxiliary CR MIMO channel and the MIMO secrecy channel by proving
that the optimal transmit covariance matrix for the secrecy channel is the same as that for the CR
channel with properly selected IT constraints for the PUs under certain conditions. Based on such a
relationship, we transform the non-convex MIMO secrecy capacity computation problem into a sequence
of CR capacity computation problems, which are convex and thus can be efficiently solved. For the case
of single-antenna eavesdroppers, the proposed algorithms obtain the exact capacity of the associated
MIMO secrecy channel, while for the case of multi-antenna eavesdroppers, the proposed algorithms
obtain both the upper and lower bounds on the MIMO secrecy capacity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system models and problem
formulations for the CR MIMO transmission and the secrecy MIMO transmission. Section III describes
the main theoretical results of this paper on the relationship between the secrecy capacity and the CR
spectrum sharing capacity. Section IV studies the case of single-antenna eavesdroppers, and develops
several algorithms to compute the MIMO secrecy capacity. Section V extends the results to the case
of multi-antenna eavesdroppers to obtain the upper and lower bounds on the MIMO secrecy capacity.
Section VI presents some numerical examples. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
Notation: Uppercase boldface and lowercase boldface letters are used to denote matrices and vectors,
respectively. (S)H , tr(S), and |S| denote the conjugate transpose, the trace, and the determinant of a
matrix S, respectively. RK denotes the vector space of K × 1 real vectors, and R denotes the field of
real numbers. I denotes an identity matrix. E[·] denotes statistical expectation. | · | denotes the absolute
value of a complex number.
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4II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present system models and problem formulations for the CR MIMO transmission
and the secrecy MIMO transmission in the following two subsections, respectively.
A. CR MIMO Transmission
As shown in Fig. 1(a), we consider a CR MIMO channel, where the SU transmitter (SU-Tx) is
equipped with N transmit antennas, and the SU receiver (SU-Rx) is equipped with M receive antennas.
The SU-Tx to SU-Rx channel is denoted by a N×M matrix Hs. Moreover, there are K single-antenna
PU receivers denoted by PUi, i = 1, · · · , K, and the channel from SU-Tx to PUi is denoted by the
N × 1 vector hi. The received signal y at SU-Rx is expressed as
y = HHs x+ z (1)
where x is the transmit signal vector at SU-Tx, and z denotes the noise vector at SU-Rx. The entries
of the noise vector are independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variables
of zero mean and covariance matrix I . Since the SU shares the same spectrum with the PUs, there are
K IT constraints imposed to the SU transmission, expressed as E[|hHi x|2] ≤ Γi, i = 1, · · · , K, where
Γi denotes the tolerable IT limit for PUi.
Consider the CR MIMO transmission problem, in which we determine the optimal transmit covariance
matrix for SU-Tx to maximize the data rate subject to the transmit power constraint and the IT constraints
for the K PUs. Mathematically, this problem can be formulated as [12]
(PA) : max
S
log |I +HHs SHs|
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P
hHi Shi ≤ Γi, i = 1, · · · , K
where S = E[xxH ] denotes the transmit covariance matrix at SU-Tx, and P denotes the transmit power
constraint. Note that S is a positive semi-definite matrix such that (PA) is a convex problem and can
be solved efficiently by the standard interior point method [15].
B. Secrecy MIMO Transmission
As shown in Fig. 1(b), we consider a MIMO secrecy channel, where the secrecy transmitter (SC-Tx)
is equipped with N transmit antennas, and the secrecy receiver (SC-Rx) is equipped with M receive
antennas. Moreover, there are K single-antenna eavesdroppers. In accordance with the earlier introduced
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response from SC-Tx to the ith eavesdropper (EAi) is denoted by hi, i = 1, · · · , K. According to the
secrecy requirement, the transmitted message W from SC-Tx should not be decoded by any of the
eavesdroppers, i.e., H(W |yi) ≥ r, ∀i, with yi denoting the received signal at EAi, and r denoting the
secrecy transmit rate. According to the results in [8], [9], the secrecy capacity can be obtained by solving
the following optimization problem
(PB) : max
S
min
i
log |I +HHs SHs| − log
(
1 +
hHi Shi
σ2i
)
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P
where S denotes the transmit covariance matrix of SC-Tx, similar to that of SU-Tx in the CR case,
and σ2i denotes the variance of the zero-mean CSCG noise at EAi.
We see that (PB) is a non-convex optimization problem since its objective function is the difference
between two concave functions of S and thus not necessarily concave. Existing methods in the literature
[8], [9], [16], [17] for the MIMO secrecy capacity computation is only applicable to the case of a single
eavesdropper. However, these methods cannot solve the case with multiple eavesdroppers (PB) even
for the case where each eavesdropper has a single antenna1.
Remark 1: According to Fig. 1, it is easy to observe that the system models of the CR transmission
and the secrecy transmission bear the similarity that they both need to control the received signal power
levels at both PUs and eavesdroppers. However, note that (PA) guarantees that the interference power
at each PU receiver is below the required threshold without considering the PU noise power, while for
(PB), through the second term in the objective function, the confidential level at each eavesdropper
is not only related to the received signal power from SC-Tx, but also related to the noise power at
eavesdroppers. Therefore, one immediate question is whether there exists a relationship between these
two systems such that we can solve the non-convex problem (PB) by transforming it into some form
of (PA) that is convex and thus efficiently solvable. With this motivation, we first study the relationship
between these two problems, and then propose corresponding algorithms to solve (PB).
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECRECY CAPACITY AND CR SPECTRUM SHARING CAPACITY
In this section, we present main theoretical results of the paper on the relationship between the secrecy
capacity computation problem (PB) and the CR spectrum sharing capacity computation problem (PA).
1Problem (PB) in the case of multi-antenna eavesdroppers will be studied later in Section V.
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we are particularly interested in the multi-antenna case since it provides a general guidance for solving
(PB).
Proposition 1: For a given (PB), there exists a set of IT constraint values, Γi, i = 1, · · · , K, such
that the resulting (PA) has the same solution as that of (PB).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 1 establishes the relationship between (PA) and (PB). To further investigate this rela-
tionship, we define an auxiliary function of Γis as
g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) := max
S
|I +HHs SHs|
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P
hHi Shi ≤ Γi, i = 1, · · · , K.
(2)
Note that the only difference between Problem (2) and (PA) is that the objective function in Problem
(2) does not involve a logarithmic function of matrix determinant while that in (PA) does. As a result,
Problem (2) is non-convex since its objective function is not concave in S. Also note that Problem (2)
is equivalent to (PA) since they have the same optimal solution for S. Therefore, although Problem
(2) is non-convex, its optimal solution can be obtained via solving the convex counterpart (PA).
Proposition 2: (PB) is equivalent to the following optimization problem:
max
Γ1,··· ,ΓK
min
i
Fi(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) :=
g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK)
1 + Γi/σ2i
. (3)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Proposition 2 establishes the relationship between (PB) and the auxiliary function g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) that
is related to (PA). The equivalence between Problem (3) and (PB) means that by solving the optimal
Γis in Problem (3), we could solve an optimal S given g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) is an embedded optimization
problem over S inside Problem (3). Such an optimal S is also the solution for (PB), for which the
explanation is given in Appendix B.
Problem (3) can be solved by utilizing an important property of g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) described as follows:
Proposition 3: The function g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) is a concave function with respect to Γ1, · · · ,ΓK , and
γi(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) :=
∂g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK)
∂Γi
= µ
(1)
i |I +H
H
s S
(1)Hs|, i = 1, · · · , K (4)
where S(1) and µ(1)i are the optimal solution of (PA) and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier (the
dual solution) with respect to the ith IT constraint, respectively.
DRAFT
7Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Note that from Proposition 3, it follows that the gradient of g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) in (3) can be obtained by
solving (PA) via the Lagrange duality method, which completes the equivalence between (PA) and
(PB) via the intermediate problem (3). At last, we have
Proposition 4: Problem (3) is a quasi-concave maximization problem.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
Proposition 4 suggests that Problem (3) can be solved by utilizing convex optimization techniques, for
which the details are given in the next section.
IV. ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present the algorithms to compute the MIMO secrecy capacity by exploiting the
relationship between the secrecy transmission and the CR transmission developed in Section III. The
algorithm for the general case of the MIMO secrecy channel with multiple eavesdroppers is presented
first. Two reduced-complexity algorithms are next presented, one for the special case with one single
eavesdropper, and the other for the special case with a single-antenna secrecy receiver, i.e., the multiple-
input single-output (MISO) secrecy channel.
A. General Case
In this subsection, we present the algorithm for (PB) in the general case of MIMO secrecy channels
with multiple eavesdroppers. According to Propositions 2 and 4, (PB) is equivalent to the quasi-concave
maximization problem (3). Thus, we instead study Problem (3) since it is easier to handle than (PB).
According to [15], a quasi-concave maximization problem can be reduced to solving a sequence of
convex feasibility problems. Thus, Problem (3) can be further transformed as
max
t,Γ1,··· ,ΓK
t
subject to : g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) ≥ t(1 + Γi/σ2i ), i = 1, · · · , K.
(5)
Let t∗ be the optimal solution of Problem (5). Clearly, t∗ is also the optimal value of Problem (3). If
the feasibility problem
max
Γ1,··· ,ΓK
0
subject to : g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) ≥ t(1 + Γi/σ2i ), i = 1, · · · , K
(6)
for a given t is feasible, then it follows that t∗ ≥ t. Conversely, if Problem (6) is infeasible, then t∗ < t.
Therefore, by assuming an interval [ 0, t¯ ] known to contain the optimal t∗, the optimal solution of
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as g(∞, · · · ,∞) from (2).
We next solve the feasibility problem (6) by a similar method discussed in [18]. It is worth noting
that the feasibility problem (6) can be viewed as an optimization problem. The Lagrangian of Problem
(6) can be written as
L0({νi},Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) =
K∑
i=1
νi
(
g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK)− t(1 + Γi/σ
2
i )
)
(7)
where νi is the non-negative dual variable for the ith constraint, and {νi} denotes ν1, · · · , νK . The
corresponding dual function is then defined as
f0({νi}) = max
Γ1,··· ,ΓK
K∑
i=1
νi
(
g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK)− t(1 + Γi/σ
2
i )
)
. (8)
Due to its convexity, Problem (6) can be transformed into its equivalent dual problem as
min
{νi}
f0({νi}) (9)
and the duality gap between the optimal values of Problem (6) and Problem (9) is zero if Problem (6)
is feasible.
Since it is known from Proposition 3 that function g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) is concave with respect to {Γ1, · · · ,
ΓK}, Problem (8) can be solved via a gradient-based algorithm. According to Proposition 3, the gradient
of function g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) can be obtained by solving (PA). Furthermore, since function f0({νi}) is
convex with respect to {νi}, Problem (9) can be solved by a subgradient-based algorithm, such as the
ellipsoid method [15]. Similar to Lemma 3.5 in [18], Problem (6) is infeasible if and only if there exist
{νi} such that f0({νi}) < 0. Using this fact along with the subgradient-based search over {νi}, the
feasibility problem (6) can be solved. In summary, the algorithm for Problem (3) with a target accuracy
parameter ǫ is listed as follows:
Algorithm 1:
• Initialization: tmin = 0, tmax = t¯.
• Repeat
– t← 1
2
(tmin + tmax).
– Solve the feasibility problem (6). If Problem (6) is feasible, tmin ← t; otherwise, tmax ← t.
– Stop, when tmax − tmin ≤ ǫ.
• The optimal value of Problem (3) is taken as tmin.
DRAFT
9B. Single-Eavesdropper Case
We now consider a special case of (PB), where there is only one single eavesdropper in the secrecy
channel, and propose a simplified algorithm over Algorithm 1 for the corresponding (PB).
Consider first the counterpart CR transmission problem (PA). For the single-PU case, (PA) can be
rewritten as
(PC) : max
S
log |I +HHs SHs|
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P
hHSh ≤ Γ
where h denotes the channel from SU-Tx to the single PU, and Γ is the corresponding IT limit for the
PU. On the other hand, for the single-eavesdropper case, the secrecy transmission problem (PB) can
be rewritten as
(PD) : max
S
log |I +HHs SHs| − log
(
1 +
hHSh
σ2
)
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P
where h denotes the channel from SC-Tx to the single eavesdropper, and σ2 denotes the variance of
the noise at the eavesdropper. Following Proposition 2, (PD) is equivalent to the optimization problem
max
Γ
F (Γ) :=
g(Γ)
1 + Γ/σ2
(10)
where the function g(Γ) is the single-PU counterpart of that in (2). Moreover, it is evident from
Proposition 4 that function F (Γ) is quasi-concave and the optimization problem (10) is a quasi-concave
maximization problem.
Lemma 1: The sufficient and necessary condition for Γ∗ to be the optimal solution of Problem (10)
is
γ(Γ∗)(1 + Γ∗/σ2) =
1
σ2
g(Γ∗) (11)
where γ(Γ) := ∂g(Γ)
∂Γ
.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
Based on Lemma 1, (PD) can be solved via the equivalent problem (10) by the bisection method
summarized as follows:
Algorithm 2:
• Initialization: Γmin = 0,Γmax = Γ¯.
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• Repeat
– Γ← 1
2
(Γmin + Γmax).
– Solve Problem (2) for the single-PU case, and compute γ(Γ). If γ(Γ)(1 + Γ/σ2) > 1
σ2
g(Γ),
Γmin ← Γ; otherwise, Γmax ← Γ.
– Stop, when Γmax − Γmin ≤ ǫ.
• The optimal solution of (PD) equals that of (PC) with the converged Γ.
Note that in the above algorithm, Γ¯ = hHSoh and So is the optimal solution of (PC) without the
interference power constraint2.
Algorithm 2 searches the optimal Γ according to its gradient direction, and thus avoids solving the
sequence of feasibility problems in Algorithm 1. Therefore, Algorithm 2 is much simpler than Algorithm
1. However, since the general case of (PB) has multiple variables Γis, this gradient-based algorithm
cannot be applied to the general case.
Remark 2: Similar to Proposition 1, a dual relationship between the secrecy transmission (PD) and
the CR transmission (PC) in the case of a single eavesdropper/PU can be described as follows. For a
given (PC), there is a parameter σ, such that (PD) with the noise variance σ2 at the eavesdropper has
the same solution as that of (PC). This property can be proved by combining Lemma 1 and Proposition
2. This proof is thus omitted for brevity.
C. Single-Antenna SC-Rx Case
We now turn our attention to another special case of the secrecy channel where SC-Rx is equipped
with a single receive antenna, i.e., the MISO secrecy channel. Same as the MIMO secrecy case, each
eavesdropper is still assumed to have a single antenna. For notational convenience, (PA), (PB), (PC),
and (PD) in the case of single-antenna SC-Rx are denoted correspondingly by PA-s, PB-s, PC-s, and
PD-s.
The problem PC-s has been studied in [12]. In [12], it was shown that the optimal transmit covariance
matrix for the CR MISO channel is a rank-one matrix, and a closed-form solution for the optimal transmit
beamforming was presented. The problem PD-s has been studied in [6], [16], where it was shown that
the optimal transmit covariance matrix for the secrecy MISO channel is also a rank-one matrix, and
based on the generalized eigenvalue decomposition, a closed-form solution for the optimal transmit
beamforming was provided.
2When Γ > Γ¯, the value of g(Γ) is constant regardless of Γ. Thus, the optimal solution of Problem (10) satisfies Γ∗ ≤ Γ¯.
DRAFT
11
Consider PA-s, in which there are multiple PUs each having a single receive antenna. To the authors’
best knowledge, no closed-form solution exists for such a case. Nevertheless, due to its convexity, this
problem can be solved via a standard interior point algorithm. By using a similar method to that in
[12], it can be shown that the optimal transmit covariance matrix for PC-s is also a rank-one matrix. In
contrast, for PB-s, due to its non-convexity, there is no existing method in the literature to solve this
problem. However, since PB-s is a special case of (PB), we can apply Algorithm 1 to efficiently solve
this problem .
Next, by exploiting the special structure of PB-s, we provide a simplified algorithm over Algorithm
1. First, we rewrite PB-s as
(PB-s) : max
S
min
i
Fˆi(S) :=
1 + hHs Shs
1 + (hHi Shi)/σ
2
i
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P
(12)
where the N × 1 vector hs denotes the channel from SC-Tx to the single antenna SC-Rx. Unlike the
general case of (PB) where only its transformed problem in (3) is a quasi-concave problem with respect
to Γis, PB-s itself is a quasi-concave problem with respect to S due to the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Fˆi(S) is a quasi-concave function for i = 1, . . . , K.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix F.
Thus, PB-s can be transformed into the following equivalent problem
max
S,t
t
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P
1 + hHs Shs ≥ t
(
1 +
hHi Shi
σ2i
)
, i = 1, · · · , K
(13)
where t is a positive variable. For the fixed t, all the constraints in the above problem are linear matrix
inequalities over S, and thus the corresponding feasibility problem (similarly defined as (6)) can be
viewed as a semi-definite programming (SDP) feasibility problem. Correspondingly, the optimal value
of t can be obtained by a bisection search algorithm.
Compared with Algorithm 1, the algorithm for Problem (13) is much simpler, since the SDP feasibility
problem can be solved via high-efficiency interior point methods, while the feasibility problem (6) in
Algorithm 1 can only be solved through a general gradient-based algorithm. Moreover, according to
Proposition 1, we can find a set of parameters Γis such that the corresponding PA-s has the same
solution of PB-s. Since the optimal solution of PA-s is known to be a rank-one matrix [12], so is the
optimal solution for PB-s.
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V. MULTI-ANTENNA EAVESDROPPER RECEIVER
In this section, we extend our results to the case with multi-antenna eavesdroppers. We assume
that each eavesdropper is equipped with Ne receive antennas, and the channel from SC-Tx to the ith
eavesdropper receiver is denoted by H i of size N ×Ne. Similar to (PB), the MIMO secrecy capacity
in the multi-antenna eavesdropper case can be obtained from the following optimization problem [9]
(PE) : max
S
min
i
log |I +HHs SHs| − log |I +H
H
i SH i| (14)
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P. (15)
To the best knowledge of the authors, there is no existing solution in the literature for the above
problem. In the following, we derive the upper and lower bounds on the MIMO secrecy capacity in
the multi-antenna eavesdropper case based on the relationship between the secrecy transmission and the
CR transmission.
A. Capacity Lower Bound
First, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2: If for any i, i ∈ {1, · · · .K}, tr(HHi SH i) ≤ Γi, we have |I + HHi SH i| ≤ (1 + ΓiL )
L
,
where L = min(Ne, N).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix G.
Similar to Proposition 2, from Lemma 2, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6: The optimal value of (PE) is lower-bounded by that of the following optimization
problem
max
Γ1,··· ,ΓK
min
i
F˜i(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) :=
g˜(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK)(
1 + Γi
L
)L (16)
where the function g˜(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) is defined as
g˜(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) := max
S
|I +HHs SHs|
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P
tr(HHi SH i) ≤ Γi, i = 1, · · · , K.
(17)
Problem (16) can be solved by the gradient-based method similar to Algorithm 1. Accordingly, the
lower bound on the MIMO secrecy capacity is obtained. Note that this capacity lower bound is tight
when Ne = 1 and thus L = 1.
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B. Capacity Upper Bound
In the multi-antenna eavesdropper case, the signals received at different antennas of each eavesdropper
are jointly processed to decode the contained secrecy message. Therefore, a straightforward upper bound
on the secrecy capacity in this case is obtained by assuming that the signals at different antennas
of each eavesdropper are decoded independently. Suppose that hi,j is the jth column of the matrix
H i, j = 1, · · · , Ne, then the upper bound on the secrecy capacity can be obtained as
max
S
min
{i,j}
log |I +HHs SHs| − log
(
1 +
hHi,jShi,j
σ2i,j
)
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P.
(18)
The above problem is the same as (PB) with the number of single-antenna eavesdroppers equal to
NeK, and thus can be solved by Algorithm 1.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide several numerical examples to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithms in computing the secrecy channel capacity under different system settings. For all examples,
we consider a MIMO secrecy channel with M = N = 4. The elements of the matrix Hs and the vectors
his (or the matrices H is in the multi-antenna eavesdropper case) are assumed to be independent CSCG
random variables of zero mean and unit variance. Moreover, the noise power at each eavesdropper
antenna is chosen to be one, and the transmit power of the secrecy transmitter, P , is defined in dB
relative to the noise power.
A. MIMO Secrecy Capacity with Two Single-Antenna Eavesdroppers
In this example, we consider a MIMO secrecy channel with K = 2 single-antenna eavesdroppers.
Fig. 2 plots the secrecy capacity of this channel obtained by Algorithm 1, where the transmit power
ranges from 0 dB to 10 dB. Moreover, a reference achievable secrecy rate of this channel is obtained by
the Projected-Channel SVD (P-SVD) algorithm in [12]. In this algorithm, the channel Hs is projected
into a space, which is orthogonal to h1 and h2, and thus the secrecy signals cannot be received by the
eavesdroppers. It is easy to observe from Fig. 2 that the secrecy rate obtained by P-SVD is less than the
secrecy capacity obtained by Algorithm 1. Moreover, from Proposition 4, it is known that the function
Fi(Γ1,Γ2) is a quasi-concave function, and thus the function mini=1,2 Fi(Γ1,Γ2) is also a quasi-concave
function. In Fig. 3, we plot the value of this function for P = 5 dB. It is observed that this function is
indeed quasi-concave.
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B. MIMO Secrecy Capacity with One Single-Antenna Eavesdropper
In this example, we apply Algorithm 2 to compute the secrecy capacity of a MIMO channel with
one single-antenna eavesdropper. As shown in Fig. 4, the secrecy capacity obtained by Algorithm 2 is
larger than the achievable secrecy rate obtained by the P-SVD algorithm. Moreover, it is verified that
function F (Γ) defined in (10) is indeed quasi-concave in Fig. 5 for P = 5 dB.
C. MIMO Secrecy Capacity with One Multi-antenna Eavesdropper
In this example, by applying the methods discussed in Section V, we show in Fig. 6 the lower and
upper bounds on the MIMO channel secrecy capacity with a single eavesdropper using Ne = 2 receive
antennas. From the capacity lower bound, we obtain a feasible transmit covariance matrix and thus
a corresponding achievable secrecy rate, shown in Fig. 6 and named as “Achievable Secrecy Rate”.
Moreover, the achievable secrecy rate by the P-SVD algorithm is also shown for comparison.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have disclosed the relationship between the multi-antenna CR transmission problem
and the multi-antenna secrecy transmission problem. By exploiting this relationship, we have transformed
the non-convex secrecy capacity computation problem into a quasi-convex optimization problem, and
developed various algorithms to obtain the optimal solution for different cases of secrecy channels.
Although the proposed method cannot obtain the exact secrecy capacity for the more complicated
multi-antenna eavesdropper case, it can be applied to compute the upper and lower capacity bounds.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1: Proposition 1 can be proved by contradiction. For the fixed σis, suppose
that the optimal solution of (PB) is So. Define Γ¯i = hHi Sohi, i = 1, . . . , K. If the optimal solution of
(PA) with Γi = Γ¯i, ∀i, denoted by S¯o, satisfies log |I +HHs S¯oHs| > log |I +HHs SoHs|, then S¯o is
a better solution for (PB) than So, which contradicts the preassumption that So is the optimal solution
of (PB). Then there must be log |I +HHs S¯oHs| ≤ log |I +HHs SoHs|, which means that So is also
the optimal solution of (PA), with Γi = hHi Sohi, i = 1, . . . , K. Proposition 1 thus follows.
B. Proof of Proposition 2: It is easy to observe that (PB) can be re-expressed as
max
S
min
i
|I +HHs SHs|
1 + hHi Shi/σ
2
i
subject to: tr(S) ≤ P.
(19)
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Suppose that So is the optimal solution of Problem (19) and (PB). Define To := |I +HHs SoHs| and
Γ¯i := h
H
i Sohi, i = 1, · · · , K, then the optimal objective value of Problem (19) is F¯ = min
(
To/(1 +
Γ¯1), · · · , To/(1 + Γ¯K)
)
.
Suppose that the optimal solution S¯o of Problem (2) with Γi = Γ¯i, ∀i, satisfies |I+HHs S¯oHs| > To,
then S¯o is a better solution for Problem (19) than So, which contradicts the preassumption that So is
the optimal solution of Problem (19). Therefore, we have To = g(Γ¯1, · · · , Γ¯K). Thus, F¯ is achievable
for Problem (3) with the particular choice of Γi = Γ¯i, ∀i.
Furthermore, suppose that Γ˜is are the optimal solutions of Problem (3), and the corresponding optimal
objective value is F˜ . For Problem (2) with Γi = Γ˜i, suppose that the optimal solution is S˜. We can
prove that F˜ ≤ F¯ by contradiction: If F˜ > F¯ , S˜ is a better solution for Problem (19) than So, which
contradicts the preassumption that So is the optimal solution of Problem (19). As such, we see that
F¯ is not only achievable for Problem (3), but also the optimal value of Problem (3) with the optimal
solutions given as S˜ = So and Γ˜i = hHi Sohi, ∀i (Note that S is a hidden design variable for Problem
(3).). Proposition 2 thus follows.
C. Proof of Proposition 3: We first study several important properties of Problem (2) that is known
to be an equivalent problem of (PA). Considering (PA) first, its Lagrangian function can be written
as
L1(S, λ, {µi}) = log |I +H
H
s SHs| − λ(tr(S)− P )−
K∑
i=1
µi(h
H
i Shi − Γi) (20)
where λ and µi are the non-negative Lagrange multipliers/dual variables with respect to the transmit
power constraint and the interference power constraint at PUi, respectively. Since (PA) is a convex
optimization problem, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [15] are both sufficient and necessary
for a solution to be optimal, and solving (PA) is equivalent to solving its dual problem
min
λ,{µi}
max
S
L1(S, λ, {µi}). (21)
On the other hand, the auxiliary problem (2) is non-convex due to the fact that its objective function
is not concave. In general, the KKT conditions may not be sufficient for a feasible solution to be optimal
when we have a non-convex optimization problem. However, we prove in the following lemma that this
is not the case for Problem (2).
Lemma 3: With Problem (2), the KKT conditions are both sufficient and necessary for a solution to
be optimal.
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Proof: The necessary part of Lemma 3 is obvious even for a non-convex optimization problem
[15]. The sufficient part of Lemma 3 can be proved via contradiction as follows. The Lagrangian of
Problem (2) can be written as
L2(S, δ, {γi}) = |I +H
H
s SHs| − δ(tr(S)− P )−
K∑
i=1
γi(h
H
i Shi − Γi) (22)
where δ and γi are the non-negative dual variables with respect to the transmit power constraint and
the interference power constraint at PUi, respectively. We first list the KKT conditions of Problem (2)
as follows:
|I +HHs SHs|Hs(I +H
H
s SHs)
−1HHs = δI +
K∑
i=1
γihih
H
i (23)
δ(tr(S)− P ) = 0 (24)
γi(h
H
i Shi − Γi) = 0, i = 1, · · · , K. (25)
Suppose that S(0), δ(0), and γ(0)i are a set of primal and dual variables that satisfy the above KKT
conditions, and the corresponding optimal value of Problem (2) is C(0).
The KKT conditions of (PA) are expressed as
Hs(I +H
H
s SHs)
−1HHs = λI +
K∑
i=1
µihih
H
i (26)
λ(tr(S)− P ) = 0 (27)
µi(h
H
i Shi − Γi) = 0, i = 1, · · · , K. (28)
Suppose that S(1), λ(1), and µ(1)i are the optimal primal and dual variables that satisfy the above KKT
conditions, and the corresponding optimal value of (PA) is C(1). Note that since (PA) is convex, the
KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient.
If (23)-(25) are not sufficient such that log(C(0)) 6= C(1), i.e., S(0) 6= S(1), we can choose
S = S(0) (29)
λ = δ(0)/|I +HHs S
(0)Hs| (30)
µi = γ
(0)
i /|I +H
H
s S
(0)Hs|, i = 1, · · · , K (31)
for (PA), which clearly also satisfy the KKT conditions of (PA). Given the sufficiency of the KKT
conditions for (PA), S(0) is also optimal for (PA) based on (29) such that log(C(0)) = C(1), which
contradicts our assumption that log(C(0)) 6= C(1). Lemma 3 thus follows.
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Essentially, it is due to the equivalence between the non-convex Problem (2) and the convex (PA)
that Lemma 3 holds. From Lemma 3, it follows that the duality gap between Problem (2) and its dual
problem, defined as
D = min
δ,{γi}
max
S
L2(S, δ, {γi}), (32)
is zero, i.e., g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) = minδ,{γi}maxS L2(S, δ, {γi}). As such, from (22) we have
∂g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK)
∂Γi
=
∂D
∂Γi
= γ
(0)
i , i = 1, · · · , K. (33)
Combining (31) and (33), the latter part of Proposition 3 thus follows.
Now we prove the concavity of g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK). For the function g(q), where q := [Γ1, · · · ,ΓK ]T ∈
RK+ , its concavity can be verified by considering an arbitrary line given by q = x+ tv, where x ∈ RK+ ,
v ∈ RK , t ∈ R+, and x+tv ∈ RK+ [15]. In the sequel, we just need to prove that the function g(x+tv)
is concave with respect to t. Moreover, if the ith IT constraint is not active for Problem (2), we have
γi = 0 from the KKT condition such that the concavity holds. To exclude the above trivial case, we
assume that all K IT constraints are active for Problem (2) in the following.
Define
f2(δ, γ1, · · · , γK) := max
S
L2(S, δ, γ1, · · · , γK) (34)
as the dual function of Problem (2). Let s be the subgradient of f2(δ, γ1, · · · , γK). According to the
definition of subgradient, the subgradient at the point [δ˜, γ˜1, · · · , γ˜K] satisfies
f2(δ¯, γ¯1, · · · , γ¯K) ≥ f2(δ˜, γ˜1, · · · , γ˜K) + ([δ¯, γ¯1, · · · , γ¯K]− [δ˜, γ˜1, · · · , γ˜K ]) · s, (35)
where [δ¯, γ¯1, · · · , γ¯K ] is another arbitrary feasible point.
Lemma 4: The subgradient s of function f2(δ, γ1, · · · , γK) at point [δ˜, γ˜1, · · · , γ˜K ] is [P− tr(S˜),Γ1−
hH1 S˜h1, · · · ,ΓK − h
H
KS˜hK ], where S˜ is the optimal solution of Problem (34) at this point.
Proof: Let S¯ be the optimal solution of Problem (34) with δ = δ¯ and γi = γ¯i, i = 1, · · · , K. Thus,
we have
f2(δ¯, γ¯1, · · · , γ¯K) = r¯ − δ¯(tr(S¯)− P )−
K∑
i=1
γ¯i(h
H
i S¯hi − Γi) (36)
≥ r˜ − δ¯(tr(S˜)− P )−
K∑
i=1
γ¯i(h
H
i S˜hi − Γi) (37)
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= r˜ − δ˜(tr(S˜)− P )−
K∑
i=1
γ˜i(h
H
i S˜hi − Γi) + δ˜(tr(S˜)− P ) +
K∑
i=1
γ˜i(h
H
i S˜hi − Γi)
− δ¯(tr(S˜)− P )−
K∑
i=1
γ¯i(h
H
i S˜hi − Γi) (38)
= f2(δ˜, γ¯1, · · · , γ¯K) + (tr(S˜)− P )(δ˜ − δ¯) +
K∑
i=1
(hHi S˜hi − Γi)(γ˜i − γ¯i) (39)
where r¯ = |I +HHs S¯Hs| and r˜ = |I +HHs S˜Hs|. According to (39), we have Lemma 4.
According to Lemma 3, Problem (2) is equivalent to its dual problem
min
δ,γ1,··· ,γK
f2(δ, γ1, · · · , γK) (40)
where f2(δ, γ1, · · · , γK) is convex. We next consider Problem (2) with parameters P,Γ1, · · · ,ΓK ,
denoted as Problem I. Assume that S(1), δ(1), γ(1)1 , · · · , γ
(1)
K are its primal and dual optimal solutions.
Moreover, we have another form of Problem (2) with parameters P,Γ1+ tv1, · · · ,ΓK + tvK , denoted as
Problem II, where t is a positive constant and vi is a real constant. Assume that S(2), δ(2), γ(2)1 , · · · , γ
(2)
K
are the primal and dual optimal solutions of Problem II. According to (34), we can write the dual
function of Problem II as
f II2 (δ, γ1, · · · , γK) := max
S
|I +HHs SHs| − δ
(
tr(S)− P
)
−
K∑
i=1
γi(h
H
i Shi − Γi − tvi) (41)
To solve Problem II, we apply the subgradient-based algorithm to search the minimum of its dual func-
tion f II2 (δ, γ1, · · · , γK) along the subgradient direction. Suppose that we start from the point [δ(1), γ
(1)
1 , · · · ,
γ
(1)
K ]. Based on Lemma 4, one valid subgradient of f2(δ, γ1, · · · , γK) at this point is
[0,Γ1 + tv1 − h
H
1 S
(1)h1, · · · ,ΓK + tvK − h
H
KS
(1)hK ] = [0, tv1, · · · , tvK ], (42)
where (42) is due to the KKT condition of Problem I: Γ(1)i −hHi S(1)hi = 0 given γ(1)i > 0, ∀i. Moreover,
according to (35), we have
f II2 (δ
(2), γ
(2)
1 ,· · ·, γ
(2)
K ) ≥ f
II
2 (δ
(1), γ
(1)
1 ,· · ·, γ
(1)
K ) + ([δ
(2), γ
(2)
1 ,· · ·, γ
(2)
K ]− [δ
(1), γ
(1)
1 , · · · , γ
(1)
K ]) · s
(1), (43)
where s(1) is the subgradient at the point [δ(1), γ(1)1 , · · · , γ
(1)
K ]. Since δ(2), γ
(2)
1 , · · · , γ
(2)
K are the dual
optimal solutions of Problem II, we have f II2 (δ(2), γ
(2)
1 , · · · , γ
(2)
K ) ≤ f
II
2 (δ
(1), γ
(1)
1 , · · · , γ
(1)
K ). Combining
this with (42) and (43), we have
K∑
i=1
γ
(2)
i tvi ≤
K∑
i=1
γ
(1)
i tvi. (44)
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Thus,
K∑
i=1
γ
(2)
i vi ≤
K∑
i=1
γ
(1)
i vi, given t > 0. (45)
Moreover, according to Lemma 3 and (22), we have
∂g(x+ tv)
∂t
=
K∑
i=1
γivi. (46)
Note that γi is the Lagrange multiplier of Problem (2) with respect to the ith IT constraint. With a
different IT threshold, i.e., a different value of t, γis are not necessarily the same, and thus γis can be
viewed as implicit functions of t. Combining (45) with (46), it is easy to observe ∂g(x+tv)
∂t
decreases
with the increase of t since the derivative change over t is given as
∑K
i=1 γ
(2)
i vi−
∑K
i=1 γ
(1)
i vi ≤ 0, i.e.,
the second order derivative of function g(x+ tv) over t is negative on an arbitrary line x+ tv in the
feasible region. Therefore, g(q) is concave. Proposition 3 thus follows.
D. Proof of Proposition 4: The quasi-concavity is define as follows [15]:
Definition 1: A function f : RK →R is called quasi-concave if all its sublevel sets
Sα = {x ∈ domf |f(x) ≥ α} (47)
for α ∈ R, are convex sets.
According to Proposition 3, g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) is a concave function of Γis. Therefore, the α-sublevel set
of Fi(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK)
Sα =
{
q
∣∣∣g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK)
1 + Γi/σ2i
≥ α
}
= {q|g(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) ≥ α(1 + Γi/σ
2
i )} (48)
is a convex set for any α, and thus the function Fi(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK) is a quasi-concave function. Since
the objective function of Problem (3) is the minimum of K quasi-concave functions, Fi(Γ1, · · · ,ΓK),
i = 1, · · · , K, it is still quasi-concave [15]. Proposition 4 thus follows.
E. Proof of Lemma 1: The optimality condition of Problem (10) is
∂F (Γ)
∂Γ
=
γ(Γ)(1 + Γ/σ2)− 1
σ2
g(Γ)(
1 + Γ/σ2
)2 = 0. (49)
Since the above optimality condition is a necessary condition for any unconstrained smooth optimization
problems regardless of its convexity [15], the necessary part of Lemma 1 follows.
We next prove the sufficient part of this lemma by contradiction. We first present a property of γ(Γ)
as follows.
Lemma 5: γ(Γ) is a non-increasing function for Γ ≥ 0.
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The proof of Lemma 5 is similar to that of Proposition 4, and thus is omitted here. Suppose that
there are two solutions Γ(1) and Γ(2), both of which satisfy the condition in (11). Furthermore, without
loss of generality, we assume Γ(1) < Γ(2). Therefore, we have
g(Γ(1)) > g(Γ(2)). (50)
According to (33), we have
g(Γ(2))− g(Γ(1))
Γ(2) − Γ(1)
≥ γ(Γ(2)). (51)
Thus,
g(Γ(2))− Γ(2)γ(Γ(2)) ≥ g(Γ(1))− Γ(1)γ(Γ(2)) ≥ g(Γ(1))− Γ(1)γ(Γ(1)) (52)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that γ(Γ(1)) ≥ γ(Γ(2)) from Lemma 5.
Since both solutions satisfy the necessary condition (11), we have
γ(Γ(1)) =
1
σ2
(
g(Γ(1))− γ(Γ(1))Γ(1)
)
(53)
γ(Γ(2)) =
1
σ2
(
g(Γ(2))− γ(Γ(2))Γ(2)
)
. (54)
From (52) and γ(Γ(1)) ≥ γ(Γ(2)), it is easy to observe that (53) and (54) hold simultaneously if and
only if γ(Γ(1)) = γ(Γ(2)) = γ. Thus, we have
g(Γ(1)) = g(Γ(2))− γ(Γ(1) − Γ(2)). (55)
Since Γ(1) < Γ(2) and g(Γ(1)) > g(Γ(2)), we further derive γ < 0, which contradicts the fact that the
Lagrange multiplier γ ≥ 0. As such the solution of (11) is unique, which implies the sufficiency given
the already proven necessity part. Lemma 1 thus follows.
F. Proof of Proposition 5: Similar to the proof given in Appendix D, the α-sublevel set of Fˆi(S)
Sα = {S|
1 + hHs Shs
1 + (hHi Shi)/σ
2
i
≥ α} (56)
= {S|1 + hHs Shs ≥ α(1 + (h
H
i Shi)/σ
2
i )}. (57)
is a convex set. Thus, Fˆi(S) is a quasi-concave function.
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G. Proof of Lemma 2: We have
|I +HHi SH i| = |I +U
H
i ΛiU i| = |I +Λi| (58)
where HHi SH i := UHi ΛiU i is the eigenvalue decomposition. Since tr(HHi SH i) = tr(Λi), from
tr(HHi SH i) ≤ Γi it follows that
tr(Λi) ≤ Γi. (59)
Combining (58) and (59) and denoting L = min(Ne, N), we have
|I +HHi SH i| ≤
∣∣I + Γi
L
I
∣∣ = (1 + Γi
L
)L (60)
where the inequality is obtained by solving the following problem: maxtr(Λi)≤Γi |I+Λi|. Lemma 2 thus
follows.
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Fig. 1. The comparison of two system models: (a) the CR MIMO channel with K single-antenna PUs; and (b) the secrecy
MIMO channel with K single-antenna eavesdroppers.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the secrecy capacity by Algorithm 1 and the secrecy rate by the P-SVD algorithm in [12] for
M = N = 4 and K = 2 single-antenna eavesdroppers.
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Fig. 3. The value of the function mini=1,2 Fi(Γ1,Γ2) for M = N = 4, K = 2 single-antenna eavesdroppers, and P = 5
dB.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the secrecy capacity by Algorithm 2 and the secrecy rate by the P-SVD algorithm in [12] for
M = N = 4 and K = 1 single-antenna eavesdropper.
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Fig. 5. The value of the function F (Γ) for M = N = 4, K = 1 single-antenna eavesdropper, and P = 5 dB.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity and two achievable secrecy rates for M = N = 4,
K = 1 eavesdropper with Ne = 2 receive antennas.
DRAFT
